(2022) “The four global worlds of welfare capitalism: Institutional, neoliberal, populist and residual welfare state regimes” Journal of European Social Policy (with Erdem Yoruk and Gabrieal Tafoya)
What welfare state regimes are observed when the analysis is extended globally, empirically and theoretically? We introduce a novel perspective into the ‘welfare state regimes analyses’ – a perspective that brings developed and developing countries together and, as such, broadens the geographical, empirical and the- oretical scope of the ‘welfare modelling business’. The expanding welfare regimes literature has suffered from several drawbacks: (i) it is radically slanted towards organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD) countries, (ii) the literature on non-OECD countries does not use genuine welfare policy variables and (iii) social assistance and healthcare programmes are not utilized as components of welfare state effort and generosity. To overcome these limitations, we employ advanced data reduction methods, exploit an original dataset (https://glow.ku.edu.tr/) that we assembled from several international and domestic sources covering 52 emerging markets and OECD countries and present a welfare state regime structure as of the mid-2010s. Our analysis is based on genuine welfare policy variables that are theorized to capture welfare generosity and welfare efforts across five major policy domains: old-age pensions, sickness cash benefits, unemployment insurance, social assistance and healthcare. The sample of OECD countries and emerging market economies form four distinct welfare state regime clusters: institutional, neoliberal, populist and residual. We unveil the composition and performance of welfare state components in each welfare state regime family and develop politics-based working hypotheses about the formation of these regimes. In- stitutional welfare state regimes perform high in social security, healthcare and social assistance, while populist regimes perform moderately in social assistance and healthcare and moderate-to-high in social security. The neoliberal regime performs moderately in social assistance and healthcare, and it performs low in social security, and the residual regime performs low in all components. We then hypothesize that the relative political strengths of formal and informal working classes are key factors that shaped these welfare state regime typologies.
Published Version(2019) “Indigenous Unrest and the Contentious Politics of Social Assistance in Mexico.” World Development (with Erdem Yoruk and Lara Sarlak)
Is social assistance being used to contain ethnic and racial unrest in developing countries? There is a growing literature on social assistance policies in the Global South, but this literature largely focuses on economic and demographic factors, underestimating the importance of contentious politics. The case of Mexico shows that social assistance programs are disproportionately directed to indigenous popula- tions, leading to diminished protest participation. Drawing on data from the 2010, 2012 and 2014 rounds of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, we apply multivariate regression analysis to examine the determinants of social assistance program participation in Mexico. Our study finds that after controlling for income, household size, age, education, and employment status, indigenous ethnic identity is a key determinant in who benefits from social assistance in Mexico. Our results show that high ethnic disparity in social assistance is not only due to higher poverty rates among the indigenous population. Rather, indigenous people receive more social assistance mainly because of their ethnic identity. In addition, this study demonstrates that indigenous people who benefit from social assistance programs are less likely to join anti-government protests. We argue that this ethnic targeting in social assistance is a result of the fact that indigenous unrest has become a political threat for Mexican governments since the 1990s. These results yield substantive support in arguing that the Mexican government uses social assistance to contain indigenous unrest. The existing literature, which is dominated by structuralist explanations, needs to strongly consider the contentious political drivers of social assistance provision in the Global South for a full grasp of the phenomenon. Social assistance in Mexico is driven by social unrest and this suggests that similar ethnic, racial, religious and contentious political factors should be examined in other developing countries to understand social assistance provisions.
Published Version(2019) "The Variable Selection Problem in the Three Worlds of Welfare Literature”, Social Indicators Research (with Erdem Yoruk, Kerem Yildirim, and Burcu Yakut-Cakar)
Based on a quantitative meta-analysis of empirical studies, this article points out a significant flaw in the Three Worlds of Welfare literature, the “variable selection problem.” Compiling, classifying, and quantitatively analysing all variables that have been employed in this literature, the article shows first that variable selection has depended more on case selection than on theory. Scholars tend to employ variables based on data availability, rather than selecting variables according to theoretical frameworks. Second, the use of welfare policy variables is mostly limited to the analysis of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, while studies analysing non-OECD countries, where data is limited, tend to use developmental outcome variables as a proxy. This tendency harms conceptualization and operationalization of welfare regimes, as well as blur the boundary between development and welfare regimes studies. Third, the use of original Esping-Andersen variables remains very limited, undermining continuity, comparability, and reliability within the literature.
Published Version(2019) “Fragile transitions from education to employment: Youth, gender and migrant status in the EU”. In E. Colombo (Ed.), Youth and the Politics of the Present: Coping with Complexity and Ambivalence. London: Routledge. (Cetin Celik, Fatos Goksen, Alpay Filiztekin, and Mark Smith)
(2018) “Policy-making and gender mainstreaming.” In J. O’Reilly, C. Moyart, T. Nazio, and M. Smith (Eds.), Youth Employment: STYLE Handbook.> Bristol: Policy Press. (with Fatos Goksen, Alpay Filiztekin, Mark Smith, Cetin Celik)
(2018) “Gender and migrant workers' fragile transitions from education to employment.” In J. O’Reilly, C. Moyart, T. Nazio, and M. Smith (Eds.), Youth Employment: STYLE Handbook. Bristol: Policy Press. (with Fatos Goksen)
(2018) “Leaving and returning to the parental home during the economic crisis.” In J. O’Reilly, C. Moyart, T. Nazio, and M. Smith (Eds.), Youth Employment: STYLE Handbook. Bristol: Policy Press. (with Fatos Goksen, Deniz Yukseker, Alpay Filiztekin, Fernanda Mazotta, Lavinia Parisi)
Popularity Through Debt: How Do Bank Credits Reinforce Authoritarian Popularity? (Revise & Resubmit)
This study examines the intersection of two key trends unfolding simultaneously during the last couple of decades: the rapid growth of household indebtedness and the steady resilience, even resurgence, of authoritarian regimes. I argue that consumer credit and mortgage plans, the main drivers of household debt, function as instruments for authoritarian leaders to sustain public approval. Credit access fosters a favorable view of the economy, leads individuals to perceive their personal well-being more positively, and reduces demands for redistribution, thereby bolstering regime popularity. Utilizing a nationally representative survey from Turkey, my analysis finds that access to credit significantly boosts support for Turkey’s authoritarian regime by buffering economic dissatisfaction and creating an illusion of financial stability. These effects are particularly pronounced among economically vulnerable groups and even opposition supporters, for whom credit serves as financial relief. Although grounded in Turkey, these findings have broader implications, revealing how household indebtedness operates as a key strategy for maintaining support in electoral autocracies and beyond.
The Politics of the Minimum Wage (with Teri Caraway)
Minimum wages increased dramatically in all regions of the Global South
during the first two decades of the 21st century. We argue that two
political logics—electoral and containment—explain both this overall
trend and why some countries have raised the minimum wage more than
others. With electoral logics, tight elections or poor performance in an
election lead governments to approve big raises for workers. With
containment logics, governments increase minimum wages in response
to large-scale working-class mobilization. Either logic on its own can
result in large hikes in the minimum wage, but wage gains are especially
strong when electoral and containment logics intersect. Drawing on two
original cross-national datasets on minimum wages and labor
mobilization, we find strong empirical evidence of both containment and
electoral logics. We also illustrate these logics qualitatively in a set of
thumbnail sketches.
The Post-Colonial Origins of Generous Authoritarian Welfare States: The Middle East and Beyond
Many contemporary social welfare policies in autocracies trace their origins to the critical decisions in the immediate post-colonial period. The early social policy choices, however, demonstrate remarkable variation, leading to distinct trajectories in the development of social welfare systems across autocracies. What explains the stark divergence in the generosity of early social welfare policies in autocracies? I argue that the presence of an Integral Mass Party (IMP)—distinguished by leadership coming from humble social origins, pervasive local presence, and a vision for significant societal change—in the immediate post-colonial era produces generous welfare states in settings with strong state apparatuses. When in power, IMPs harness welfare as a tool for intrusive nation-building, and in opposition, they exert pressure on ruling elites to expand welfare reach. A strong state apparatus aids in designing and implementing these welfare programs. Drawing on case studies from the Middle East, and three original datasets spanning 75 autocratic regimes, this study shows that this intersection has produced robust authoritarian welfare states that distribute social welfare to broad segments of society and have high-quality social benefits.
America’s Minimum Wage in Comparative Perspective (with Teri Caraway)
In comparative terms, the United States is an outlier when it comes to the minimum wage. While countries worldwide regularly raise minimum wages, the U.S. Congress has done so only five times in the past fifty years. Why has the U.S. federal government raised the minimum wage so infrequently? Scholars often point to ideology, declining union power, and polarization as key factors. While these dynamics are important, we argue that the legislature’s central role in wage determination amplifies their effects. The requirement for legislative approval introduces multiple veto points, exacerbating the impacts of partisanship, polarization, and declining union power, and ultimately obstructing wage adjustments. To substantiate this argument, we compare the U.S. to Hungary, where similar challenges of partisanship, polarization, and union weakness exist, yet minimum wages are frequently adjusted. Hungary’s executive-controlled wage-setting system bypasses legislative barriers, enabling regular and strategically motivated wage increases. By concentrating decision-making authority in the executive branch, Hungary’s institutional design allows governments to adjust the minimum wage frequently for political and economic objectives, even in a context of political polarization and weak labor representation. This comparison demonstrates how institutional frameworks fundamentally shape minimum wage outcomes, with executive control proving essential to Hungary’s success. Our analysis suggests that institutional reforms in the U.S., granting more centralized authority over wage policy, could mitigate legislative gridlock and facilitate more timely and substantial wage adjustments. Ultimately, this study provides a fresh perspective on wage stagnation in the U.S., highlighting the critical role of institutional design in addressing these challenges.
Guns versus Governance: Military Rule and Defense Spending (with Pedro Accorsi)
Contrary to common expectations, political science literature has not conclusively shown that military regimes spend more on defense than other autocratic regimes. We propose a novel theory that, in fact, military regimes tend to maintain lower levels of defense spending compared to other autocracies. This outcome is driven by two key domestic factors: the shift in military priorities after seizing power and the regime’s ability to control these interests. We argue that once the armed forces take power, their focus shifts from purely military objectives to broader governance challenges. As a result, they deprioritize traditional military concerns, including high defense spending. Furthermore, military regimes can confidently reduce defense expenditures and reallocate resources without fear of significant opposition. This is because there are no external checks on their decisions—they control the military apparatus, and any dissent would come from within, making any opposition fragmented and ineffective. We test our argument using data on autocratic regimes and defense spending from 1946 to 2008 and further illustrate the mechanisms through case studies of Brazil and Egypt. Our findings reveal that military regimes consistently maintain significantly lower defense expenditures compared to other types of authoritarian regimes. These results contribute to our understanding of autocratic governance, resource allocation, and civil-military relations, and offer new insights into how different autocratic structures shape both military interests and regimes' capacity to manage those interests.
Determinants of Labor Union Membership (with Fuat Kına & İbrahim Kuran)
This study contributes to the literature on unionization by developing and empirically testing a framework that analyzes the determinants of union membership through the lens of interacting macro- and micro-level political and economic dynamics within globalized liberal capitalism. Our central argument is that while the decision to join a labor union is ultimately an individual one, this choice is fundamentally shaped by the broader political and economic context in which workers’ decision-making is embedded. By explicitly testing the interactions between macro and micro-level political and economic determinants, our findings shed new light on the multifaceted forces driving unionization in the modern global economy.
The Ottoman Roots of Local Development Disparities in the Middle East.
The One-State Reality Reinforced: The Hydro-Politics of Israel(With Ryan Cudworth)
Correcting Distortions in Latent Measures: A Penalized Regression Approach to Item Response Theory(with Josef Woldense)
Foreign Intervention and Authoritarian Popularity(With Pedro Accorsi)
The Colonial Roots of Patriarchy(With Lewis Davis)